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In the company law there is a basic principle that the company is an autonomous legal 
entity and independent from other subjects of law. In the relationship of the parent company 
and the subsidiaries we can find two perspectives: 
- on the one hand an economic perspective, the separate corporations constitute one 
enterprise (the subsidiaries are or can be instructed/directed by the parent company), 
the group of corporations is a unitary business entity; 
- on the other hand a legal perspective, the coherence and the conflict among the 
interest of the parent company, the interest of the subsidiaries and the interest of the 
group.1 
The interest of the group is recognized in France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and in the Nordic countries.2 
We can distinguish among three notions related to the regulation of the group of 
corporations at the Member States level: the German, the British and the French. In the 
German approach (Konzernrecht) the concern law only applies to stock companies 
(Aktiengesellschaft, AG), and both contractual groups (Vertragskonzern) and factual groups 
(faktischer Konzern) are regulated. The interest of the group are recognized, and the parent 
company has the right to give instructions to the controlled companies, but it has a duty to 
compensate the losses and damages of the subsidiaries originating from the direction of the 
controlling company. In the British approach there is no special provision for the group of 
corporations. However, the directors of controlled companies are able to take into account the 
interest of the group in decision-making. In the United Kingdom the subsidiary director’s 
personal liability for wrongful trading is a safeguard contrary to the parent company. In the 
French approach the interest of the group derives from the Rozenblum decision of the French 
                                                            
1 CONAC, PIERRE-HENRI: Director’s Duties in Groups of Companies – Legalizing the Interest of the Group at 
the European Level, in European Company and Financial Law Review, 2/2013. p. 195., p. 215. 
2 CONAC: op.cit. p. 209. 
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Supreme Court (1985): the court recognized the interest of the group. In France the directors 
of the controlled companies may take into consideration - under specific conditions - the 
interest of the group in their decision-making causing detriments to the subsidiary.3 
The Rozenblum decision established four requirements for the group of corporations: 
- a capital links should exist among the subjects of the group; 
- there is an effective business integration within the group in the sense of effort of 
common interest; 
- there are mutual commitments and economic remuneration (benefit) among the 
concerned companies (in Italy theory of compensatory advantages); 
- for a long-term any support from the controlled companies must not exceed their 
potential.4 
At the European level there were two attempts to regulate the groups of companies: the 
fifth directive and the preliminary draft of ninth directive, but they failed.5 The issue of the 
group law appeared again in the „Winter report” (Report of the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe of 
2002).6 In the sense of the wholly-owned subsidiaries the 2008 proposal on the Statute for a 
European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE) was important.7 The next step 
forward the recognition of the group interest was the Reflection Group on the Future of EU 
Company Law of 2011.8 In the Action Plan (2012):9 European Company Law and Corporate 
Governance – a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable 
Companies the Commission aimed an initiative in 2014 to recognize the concept of the group 
interest.10 The newest developments are the Proposal for a Directive on Single-Member 
Private Limited Liability Companies (Societas Unius Personae, SUP)11 in connection with the 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (among others: in order to facilitate the operation of groups of 
companies), and the Commission’s questionnaire to survey the positions in EU in connection 
with the recognition of the concept of group interest. 
                                                            
3 CONAC: op.cit. pp. 199-201. 
4 CONAC: op.cit. p. 219. 
5 AUER ÁDÁM – BAKOS KITTI – BUZÁSI BARNABÁS – FARKAS CSABA – NÓTÁRI TAMÁS – PAPP 
TEKLA: Társasági jog (Company Law), ed.: PAPP TEKLA, 2011, Lectum Kiadó, Szeged, pp. 612-613.; 
CONAC: op.cit. p. 196. 
6 CONAC: op.cit. p. 196. 
7 CONAC: op.cit. p. 197. 
8 CONAC: op.cit. p. 203. 
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
10 CONAC: op.cit. p. 204. 
11 COM(2014) 212 final 2014/0120 (COD) 
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I. Fundamental and general statements in connection with the Hungarian 
group of corporations 
 
In Hungary the law of groups of corporations is a special field of company law, but also 
regulated by the Capital Market Act.12 The concern: a participant of the economic life 
acquires influence concerning mechanism of decision-making in the limited liability 
company, stock company, grouping and cooperative society registered in the Firm Registry 
and operated independently, as a result of that the companies/associations keep their legal 
independence, but they constitute an economic unit.13 Within the law of groups of 
corporations we can separate the recognized (qualified) concern and the de facto (actual/real) 
concern.14 The recognized concern is based on a contractual relationship, on a control 
contract. The de facto concern is founded on the fact of influence acquisition, without 
concluding a contract.15 
The essence of influence16 can be 
                                                            
12 CXX of 2001 
13 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 538. 
14 For details see: VECSEY, MARC: Haftungsrisiken für (ausländische) Muttergesellschaft in ungarischen 
Konzernstrukturen, in: Haftungsrisiken für die Konzernmutter in Mittel- und Osteuropa, ed.: WINNER, 
MARTIN, 2013, facultas.wuv, Wien, pp. 736-745. 
15 PAPP TEKLA 2013. évi V. törvény 3. Könyv VI. Cím kommentárja (Commentary of Title VI of 3rd Book of 
Act V of 2013) in: Great Commentary to the Act V of 2013 and to the connecting legal regulations, ed.: 
OSZTOVITS ANDRÁS, 2014, Opten Informatikai Kft., Budapest, p. 449. 
16 Act V of 2013 Section 8:2 Influence: 
(1) majority control means a relationship where a natural or legal person (holder of a participating interest) 
controls over 50% of the voting rights in a legal person, or in which it has a dominant influence. 
(2) The holder of a participating interest is deemed to have dominant influence on a legal person if it is a 
member of or shareholder in that company and: 
a) it has the right to appoint and recall the majority of the executive officers or supervisory board 
members of the legal person; or 
b) other members of or shareholder in that legal person are committed under agreement with the 
holder of a participating interests to vote in concert with the holder of a participating interest, or 
they exercise their voting rights through the holder of a participating interest, provided that together 
control more than half of votes. 
(3) Majority control is also deemed to exist if the entitlements referred to in subsections 1-2 are ensured 
indirectly to the holder of a participating interest. 
(4) Indirect control on a legal person means a relationship where a person is able to exercise influence on a 
legal person that has voting rights in that legal person (intermediary legal person). The scope of indirect 
control means the percentage of control held by the intermediary legal person that correspond to the 
percentage of control the holder of a participating interest has in the intermediary legal person. If the 
holder of a participating interest controls more than half of the votes in the intermediary legal person, 
the control the intermediary legal person has in the legal person shall be taken into account in its 
entirety as indirect control held by the holder of a participating interest. 
(5) The direct and indirect ownership interest and voting rights of close relatives shall be applied 
contemporaneously. 
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- a „voting concern”, where a member acquires the determined percentage of votes and 
exercises his/her voting rights;17 or 
- the right to appoint, to recall and to establish the remuneration of the executive 
officers and members of the supervisory board, or 
- other way which provides decisive direction and checking for the controlling 
company above the operation of the controlled company.18 
There are two opinions in Hungary in connection with the foundation of concern 
situation: 
- a concern situation comes into existence only when the acquisition of share is based 
on a legal transaction (on privity), but not on a legal fact (for example inheritance), 
and not on the oragnizational amendment (for example merger);19 
- according to the other opinion there is no importance of the legal title of the 
acquisition, the legal grounds can be ipso iure or succesion.20 
The acquisition of influence is not equivalent to the acquisition of share, it can be 
established by facts of both company law and private law.21 The fact and the measure of 
influence adjust to the proportion of votes; it can be reached by a determined percentage of 
votes, or by share with priority voting rights, or by establishment of usufruct on the other 
members’ shares, or if the other members have shares with priority rights but without voting 
rights.22 
The subjects of the concern situation are the controlling/parent company and the 
controlled companies/subsidiaries. A group of corporations may consist of stock companies, 
limited liability companies, groupings and cooperative societies.23 If a group of corporations 
is led jointly by several legal persons, they shall enter into an agreement to determine the one 
enabled to exercise the rights of the dominant member in accordance with the control 
contract.24 
The recognized group of corporations means a form of featuring a common business 
strategy among at least one dominant member that is required to draw up consolidated annual 
accounts and at least three members controlled by the dominant member under a control 
                                                            
17 BDT 2002. 173. (Casebook of the Courts) 
18 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 539.; PAPP (commentary): op.cit. p. 449. 
19 VEZEKÉNYI URSULA: A konszernjogi felelősség kérdőjelei (Question marks of the liabilty of concern law), 
Gazdaság és Jog, 4/2002., p. 11. 
20 LB Gfv. XX. 31654/200/5.; LB Gf. I. 32620/2000/10. (Decisions of the Supreme Court) 
21 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 539. 
22 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 539. 
23 Section 3:49 (2) of Act V of 2013 (Hungarian Civil Code; hereafter abbreviated: CC) 
24 Section 3:49 (3) of CC 
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contract.25 By reason of this the conjunctive conditions of the recognized group of 
corporations are the following: at least one controlling member (with commitment to draw up 
consolidated annual accounts), at least – permanently – three members controlled by the 
parent company, and these members conclude a control contract based on a common business 
strategy. The recognized group of corporations is neither a legal entity nor a legal person.26 
The concern law regulates only the acquisition of influence in existing companies, it is 
irrelevant to the influence originating at the timepoint of the foundation of companies.27 The 
regulation of concern law is divided into two parts: the rules of process and legal effect of 
acquisition of influence (general and dynamic regulation of concern law) and the provisions 
for special rights and duties connecting with the existing influence (particular regulation of 
concern law).28 
 
II. The group interest 
 
By means of exercising of influence the controlling company can enforce its interests 
during the operation of the group of corporations. Through it the interest-identity between the 
dominant member and the company can be injured, the interest of the controlling member 
does not necessarily suit the object of the company. One of the duties of concern law is to 
balance the conflict of interests among the parent company and the subsidiaries,29 as the 
exercising of influence concerns the minority of the controlled companies and also their 
creditors.30 
This conflict of interests (concern conflict) between the dominant member and the 
company is legally legitimate, and the „Treupflicht” is effective only in the de facto 
concern.31 The subsidiaries are operating under unified direction (in economic sense) and 
typically according to the interests of the dominant member.32 The dominant member 
                                                            
25 Section 3:49 (1) of CC; MISKOLCZI-BODNÁR PÉTER: Az elismert vállalatcsoport az új Ptk-ban (The 
recognized group of corporations in the new Civil Code), in: Acta Caroliensia Conventorum Scientiarum 
Iuridico-Politicarum IX., Megújulás a jogi személyek szabályozásában – tanulmányok az új Ptk. köréből, 
(Renewal in the regulation of the legal persons – essays in connection with the new Civil Code), ed.: 
MISKOLCZI-BODNÁR PÉTER – GRÁD-GYENGE ANIKÓ, 2014, KRE ÁJK, Budapest, pp. 148-150. 
26 PAPP (commentary): op.cit. p. 449. 
27 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 540. 
28 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 540. 
29 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 538. 
30 PAPP (ed.): op.cit. p. 540. 
31 DARÁZS LÉNÁRD: A konszernjogi uralmi szerződés polgári jogi és/vagy társasági jogi természete (The civil 
and/or company law nature of the control contract in concern law), in: Liber amicorum, Studia A. Harmathy 
dedicata, 2003, ELTE ÁJK Polgári Jogi Tanszék, Budapest, p. 168. 
32 DARÁZS: op.cit. p. 169. 
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subordinates the controlled companies to its business interests in return for adequate 
compensation of detriments.33 The interests of the group of corporations are primary until the 
subsidiaries (and their stakeholders: members and creditors) can proportionally share in the 
benefits of the concern situation and also in the fair dividing of the disadvantages of the group 
of corporations.34 It means that in the recognized group of corporations the dominant member 
can not instruct unlimitedly the management of the controlled companies, and the concern 
situation does not grant exemption from the liability of the controlled companies’ directors for 
detriments causing by the execution of the dominant member’s decisions.35 Tamás Sárközy is 
of the opinion that 
- the necessary minimum of the autonomy shall be provided for subsidiaries, 
- the subsidiaries’ management can be instructed only from the reason and to the extent 
of the performance of the business political conception of the group of corporations.36 
The recognized group of corporations comes into existence by concluding the control 
contract (Beherrschungsvertrag). If only the dominant member holds any share in the 
controlled member of a group of corporations, no control contract is required; instead, the 
mandatory layout of the control contract shall be provided for in the instrument of constitution 
of the dominant member and the controlled member.37 The control contract lays down the 
common business strategy for a group of corporations.38 The control contract shall inter alia 
contain the following 
- the corporate names and registered offices of the dominant member and the controlled 
members, 
- the mode of cooperation within the group, including the key aspects, 
- an indication as to wether the group of corporation is established for a limited period 
of time or for an indefinite duration.39 The autonomy of the controlled companies may be 
restricted in the manner and to the extent specified in the control contract with a view to 
achieving the common business objective.40 The control contract shall provide for the 
protection of the rights of the controlled members, and for the protection of creditors’ 
                                                            
33 DARÁZS: op.cit. p. 182. 
34 GADÓ GÁBOR: A vállalatcsoport szabályozása az új társasági törvényben (The regulation of the group of 
corporations in the new company act), Gazdaság és Jog, 1/2004., p. 4. 
35 GADÓ: op.cit. p. 4.; DARÁZS: op.cit. p. 175. 
36 SÁRKÖZY TAMÁS: Szervezetrendszerek és a polgári jogi jogalanyiság a társasági-egyesületi és az 
alapítványi jogban (The organizational systems and the civil law legal entity in the law of companies, 
associations and foundations), Gazdaság és Jog, 9/2003., p. 31.; GADÓ: op.cit. p. 4. 
37 Section 3:54 of CC 
38 Section 3:50 (1) of CC 
39 Section 3:50 (2) of CC 
40 Section 3:50 (3) of CC 
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interests.41 The general provisions pertaining to contracts shall also apply to control 
contract.42 The control contract restricts the economic independence of the controlled 
companies and makes possible to realize unified business conception, the members are acting 
in the interests of the concern.43 
In my opinion the recognition of the group interest is realized through the content of the 
control contract and by the determination of the common business strategy. But to my mind 
the common business strategy is not the same as the group interest, the latter is a narrower 
category: the common business strategy includes also the group interest, but also more (see: 
business plans, financial reports, budget, business conceptions, organizational relations etc.). 
The recognition of the group interest is directly expressed in the Hungarian Civil Code in 
connection with the liability of the subsidiaries’ executive officers: the executive officer of a 
controlled member shall manage the controlled member in accordance with the control 
contract, under the governance of the dominant member, based on the primacy of the business 
policy of the group of corporations as a whole; the executive officer shall be exempt from 
liability to members if his conduct is found to be in compliance with provisions set out in the 
relevant legislation and in the control contract.44 
 
III. Safeguards contrary to the parent company in concern law 
 
1. Transparency 
The dominant member shall make a public announcement on the formation of the group 
of corporations within 8 days after gaining knowledge of the last decision on the approval of 
the control contract on two occasions, at least 30 days apart.45 The public announcement shall 
contain the control contract and a notice addresses to the creditors and shreholders of the 
controlled members.46 The management of the dominant member shall submit an application 
to the Court of Registry for registration of the group of corporations within 60 days after 
gaining knowledge of the last approval of the control contract;47 and the firm registry is 
                                                            
41 Section 3:50 (3) of CC 
42 Section 3:50 (4) of CC 
43 DARÁZS: op.cit. p. 175. 
44 Section 3:55 (4) of CC 
45 Section 3:51 (3) of CC 
46 Section 3:51 (4) of CC 
47 Section 3:51 (5) of CC 
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authentic and public. After the registration the provisions relating to members with a 
qualifying holding shall not apply to the group of corporations and its members.48 
2. The buy-out right of the subsidiaries’ members 
The members of a controlled company that participates in a group of corporations may 
request within a 30-day preclusive period following the second publication of the notice on 
the formation of the group of corporations that their shares be purchased by the dominant 
member at the market value prevailing at the time of publication of the announcement.49 A 
group of corporations may be registered if all rightfull claims of the members of the 
controlled legal persons have been satisfied, or if the court has dismissed the request of the 
members in a legal action brought to that effect.50 
3. The rights of the subsidiaries’ creditors 
If a creditor lays any claim to a controlled member participating in the group of 
corporations at the time of the first publication of the announcement, the creditor may demand 
adequate safeguards from the controlled member within a 30-day preclusive period following 
the second publication of the announcement.51 Any creditor whose claim is already 
guaranteed – pursuant to statutory provision or contract – shall not be entitled to demand such 
safeguards, including if it is not justified in light of the controlled member’s financial standing 
or of the contents of the control contract.52 A group of corporations may be registered if all 
rightful claims of the creditors of the controlled legal persons have been satisfied, or if the 
court has dismissed the request of the creditors in a legal action brought to that effect.53 
                                                            
48 Section 3:53 of CC; Section 3:324 of CC: Extra commitments of members with a qualifying holding 
(1) Where a member of a limited liability company or a shareholder of a private company limited by shares 
– directly or indirectly – controls at least 3/4 of the votes, the Court of Registry shall be notified thereof 
within 15 days from the time of acquisition of such qualifíing holding for the purpose of registration 
and publication. 
(2) Within a 60-day preclusive period reckoned from the date of notification of the acquisition of a 
qualifying holding, any member (shareholder) of the company may request that his shares be purchased 
by the owner of the qualifying holding. The owner of a qualifying holding must purchase such shares at 
the market value prevailing at the time when the request was submitted, which value may not be lower 
than the value the shares represent in the company’s own capital. 
(3) If the company is dissolved without succession, at the request of the creditors the owner of the 
qualifying holding shall cover any claim for which no satisfaction had been provided, provided that 
dissolution without succession was brought about in consequence of the poor business decisions of the 
owner of the qualifying holding. This provision is not applicable int he case where the company is 
wound up without going into liquidation. 
49 Section 3:52 (1) of CC; BH 2006. 91. (Court Order); SZIT-H-Gf-2009-78. (Decision of the High Court of 
Appeal of Szeged) 
50 Section 3:52 (3) of CC 
51 Section 3:52 (2) of CC 
52 Section 3:52 (2) of CC 
53 Section 3:52 (3) of CC 
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Any creditor of the controlled member whose claim reaches 10% of the controlled 
member’s subscribed capital may request the management of the dominant member to 
provide information on the implementation of the control contract, and on the controlled 
member’s finacial standing. If the management of the dominant member fails to comply with 
the requets, or if the information supplied is insufficient, the creditor may request the Court of 
Registry to adjudicate that the dominant member is in breach of the control contract.54 
4. The protection of the minority stakeholders 
A group of members controlling at least 5% of the voting rights in the controlled 
company and the executive officers of the controlled company may request that the supreme 
body of the dominant member be convened if they notice any substantive or repeated breach 
of the control contract. If the management of the dominant member fails to comply with such 
request within 15 days of the date of receipt, and fails to convene the meeting of the supreme 
body within 30 days, the Court of Registry shall convene the meeting of the supreme body at 
the request of the members making the proposal, or shall empower the requesting members to 
convene the meeting within the prescribed deadline. The costs of the meeting shall be 
advanced by the dominant member, however, if the request is found unsubstantiated, the costs 
shall be borne by the requesting parties.55 
5. Employee participation 
If employee participation in the supervisory board is mandatory in at least three 
controlled members of a registered group of corporations, the supreme body of the dominant 
member may permit, if so requested by the works councils concerned, that the representatives 
of employees participate in the supervisory board of the dominant member instead of the 
supervisory bodies of the controlled members. In that case the instrument of constitution of 
the dominant member shall provide for the setting up of a supervisory board, if the given 
member did not have one. The mode of delegation of the representatives of employees in that 
case shall be regulated by way of an agreement (under the general provisions for contracts) 
among the management of the dominant member and the works councils of the controlled 
members affected.56 
6. Regulation of the relations between the management of the dominant member and the 
controlled member 
                                                            
54 Section 3:56 (2) of CC 
55 Section 3:57 of CC 
56 Section 3:58 of CC 
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The management of the dominant member shall have the right to give instructions to the 
management of the controlled member as specified in the control contract, and to issue 
binding resolutions relating to the controlled member’s operation. If the dominant member’s 
actions are in compliance with the control contract, the provisions of the Civil Code 
pertaining to the supreme body’s exclusive jurisdiction and to management autonomy shall 
not apply to the controlled member.57 
If the control contract provides facilities to delegate competence upon the dominant 
member for the election and recall of the controlled member’s executive officers and 
supervisory board members, and for determining their remuneration, an employee of the 
dominant member may be appointed as director of the controlled company.58 
The executive officers and supervisory board members of the dominant member may also 
serve at the controlled member as executive officers and supervisory board members.59 
The management of both the dominant member and the controlled member shall report to 
their supreme body at the intervals fixed in the control contract, but at least once a year on the 
fulfillment of the objectives set out in the control contract. Any provision of the control 
contract providing for a less frequent reporting obligation shall be null and void.60 
7. Measures of the Court of Registry 
In the event of any major or repeated breach of the control contract, the Court of Registry 
shall, upon request by either of the parties with legal interest: 
- call on the dominant member to abide by the control contract, 
- introduce supervisory measures, 
- dissolve the group of corporations.61 
 
IV. The disadvantageous group’s common business strategy and the types of 
liability 
 
If any controlled member of the group is undergoing liquidation, the dominant member 
shall be held liable for any debt the member may have outstanding; the dominant member 
shall be relieved of liability if able to verify that the controlled member’s insolvency did not 
                                                            
57 Section 3:55 (1) of CC 
58 Section 3:55 (2) of CC 
59 Section 3:55 (3) of CC 
60 Section 3:56 (1) of CC 
61 Section 3:60 of CC 
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arise as a consequence of the group’s common business strategy62 (secondary, unlimited 
liability).63 The instruction-right of the dominant member and its result, the dependant 
situation of the controlled member is the reason for the liability of the dominant member.64 A 
casual relation must be between the disadvantageous group’s common business strategy and 
the insolvency of the controlled member: the business policy of the group of corporations 
caused the detriment (reduction of the assets) of the controlled member; the liability of the 
following each other dominant members is not joint and several.65 
We have to take into account the disadvantageous common business strategy from the 
aspect of the controlled member and have to examine the activity of the dominant member.66  
The continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy shall be qualified as 
willful, intentious and seriously actionable conduct.67 
The loan/credit/lend and its partial ceasing by the dominant member to the controlled 
member, the attempt to sell the share of the dominant member, the single disadvantageuos 
activity of the dominant member, the entering into loss-making contracts by the dominant 
member and the infrigement of the rules of the accounting act by the dominant member do not 
base the establishment of the continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy 
by the dominant member in the Hungarian jurisdiction.68 If the origin of the detriments of the 
controlled member can be traced back to objective economic processes and changes, therefore 
the termination of the loss-making subsidiary by the dominant member is a rational owner’s 
decision, then it can not be considered as the base of the liability of the dominant member.69 If 
both the dominant member and the controlled member have losses in consequence of a bad 
business decision, then it does not mean a disadvantageous common business strategy; the 
overall effect exercised by particular harms is authoritative for establishment of the 
disadvantageous common business strategy.70 
If the business decisions of the dominant member causes losses to the controlled member, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of this decisions are balanced within the concern, but 
this conduct of the dominant member establishes the liability of the parent company for the 
                                                            
62 Section 3:59 of CC; BH 2007.418.; BH 2005. 187. (Court Orders) 
63 ÍH 2006. 123.; ÍH 2006. 77. (Decisions of the High Court of Appeal) 
64 ÍH 2004. 36. (Decision of the High Court of Appeal) 
65 2013. P.4 (Decision of the Curia) 
66 BH 2008. 91. (Court Order); TÖRÖK TAMÁS: Konszernjog (Concern Law), 2009, hvgorac, Budapest, p. 
181. 
67 TÖRÖK: op.cit. p. 181. 
68 BH 2008. 91. (Court Order) 
69 EBH 2005. 1228. (Decision of the Supreme Court) 
70 ÍH 2006. 126. (Decision of the High Court of Appeal) 
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continuation of disadvantageous common business strategy.71 The disadvantageous common 
business strategy can be realized by the negligence of the dominant member,72 by its inactive 
conduct (no compensation of the subsidiary’s loss, no reduction of the capital of the 
controlled member, no money for maintenance of the subsidiary’s real estates) in that interest 
of reaching own economic aims.73 This decision of the Hungarian Curia is a controversial 
question in the Hungarian legal literature:74 the legal ground of the liability of the dominant 
member can be a negligence, but only then, when this negligence is an infrigment of the rules 
of law or of the instrument of constitution, otherwise the Curia gives priority to the creditors’ 
protection against the owner’s interest. 
We can also find a provision for the responsibility of the controlling company in the act 
on bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation proceedings, and it is not quite harmonious with 
the regulation in Hungarian Civil Code.75 In respect of the liquidation of a company under 
control by qualified majority, a single member company or a sole proprietorship, the 
controlling party or the sole member (shareholder) shall be responsible without limitation for 
the company’s liabilities which are not covered by the debtor’s assets during the liquidation 
proceedings, if the court has established the unlimited and full liability of such member 
(shareholder) for the company’s debts pursuant to a claim filed by the creditor during the 
liquidation proceedings or within a 90-day preclusive period following the time of publication 
in the Cégközlöny (Firm Gazette) of the resolution on the final conclusion of liquidation 
proceedings, on account of such member (shareholder) having had a permanent 
disadvantageous business strategy from the standpoint of the debtor company.76 The content 
of the statements of facts in Civil Code and in Bankruptcy Act is different: 
- the dominant member controls over 75%, or 100% of the voting rights in the 
controlled member on the ground of Bankruptcy Act; 
- the liability of the parent company is valid under liquidation in the Bankruptcy Act, 
and after liquidation in the Civil Code; 
                                                            
71 EBH 2004. 1038. (Decision of the Supreme Court); WINNER (ed.): op.cit. p. 734. 
72 BDT 2012. 2645. (Casebook of the Courts); NOCHTA TIBOR: Néhány gondolat a konszernfelelősség 
magánjogi dogmatikájáról (Some thoughts of the private dogmatics of the concern liability), in: Acta Caroliensia 
Conventorum Scientiarum Iuridico-Politicarum IX.; Megújulás a jogi személyek szabályozásában – tanulmányok 
az új Ptk. köréből, (Renewal in the regulation of the legal persons – essays in connection with the new Civil 
Code), ed.: MISKOLCZI-BODNÁR PÉTER – GRÁD-GYENGE ANIKÓ, 2014, KRE ÁJK; Budapest, p. 238) 
73 Kúria Gfv. X. 30.082/2012. (Decision of the Curia) 
74 SZEGEDI ANDRÁS: A Kúria döntése az egyedüli részvényes felelősségéről (The decision of the Curia about 
the single-member shareholder’s liability), JeMa, Jogesetek Magyarázata, 2/2013., pp. 26-30. 
75 Act XLIX of 1991 Section § 63 (2) 
76 WINNER (ed.): op. cit. pp. 788-789. 
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- for claim there is a preclusive period in the Bankruptcy Act, but the general term of 
limitation in the Civil Code; 
- the condition „permanent” is required in the Bankruptcy Act, and not in the Civil 
Code in connection with the continuation of the disadvantageous common business 
strategy; 
- the dominant member is liable for any debt of the controlled member, which were 
staying unsatisfied by the subsidiary’s assets in accordance with the Civil Code, but 
upon the Bankruptcy Act the controlling company is liable only for such debts which 
were claimed by the creditors during the liquidation process, or within a preclusive 
deadline; 
- the provision of the Civil Code emphasizes the causal relation between the liquidation 
of the controlled member and the common business strategy. 
The act on public firm information, firm registry and winding-up proceedings also 
mentions the liability of the dominant member.77 If the Court of Registry removed a firm with 
member’s limited liability from the firm register by way of involuntary de-registration 
procedure, the firm’s former member - registered at the time of de-registration - shall bear 
unlimited liability for the outstanding claims of the firm’s creditors, if found to have abused 
his limited liability. A member is considered to have abused his limited liability if having had 
a permanent disadvantageous business strategy, or who disposed over the firm’s assets as his 
own, or who supported a resolution, in respect of which he knew, or should have known given 
reasonable care that such resolution was clearly contrary to the significant interests of the 
firm. Here there are also differences between the contents of the statements of facts in Civil 
Code and Firm Act: 
- the rule in the Firm Act can be applied only for the member of the limited liability 
company, for the shareholder and for the member of the cooperative, but not for the 
member of a grouping (where the member has secondary and unlimited liability), 
opposite to this the regulation in the Civil Code refers to all legal entities in concern 
law; 
- the condition „permanent” is required in the Firm Act, and not in the Civil Code in 
connection with the continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy; 
- the continuation of the disadvantageous common business strategy is identical with 
the abuse of member’s limited liability in the Firm Act; 
                                                            
77 Act V of 2006 §§ 118/A (1), (2) 
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- the liability of the dominant member can be established only after the involuntary de-
registration procedure according to the Firm Act; 
- the provision of the Civil Code underlines the causal relation between the liquidation 
of the controlled member and the common business strategy. 
Beside the safeguards contrary to the controlling company in the concern law other 
measures can be found in the Hungarian company law for protection of the subsidiaries; 
without the demand of fullness: 
- the information right of the controlled member;78 
- the prohibition of voting during the passing resolution;79 
- the liability for the legal person’s debts (transfer of liability, Übergang der Haftung);80 
- the piercing of the corporate veil (Haftungsdurchgriff);81 
- the wrongful trading,82 but this provision in the Civil Code does not accord with other 
relevant rules (§ 118/B in Firm Act and § 33/A in Bankruptcy Act) and with the 
                                                            
78 Section 3:23 of CC: Confidentiality and obligation of information 
(1) The executive officer is required to keep the members of the legal person informed concerning the legal 
person, and to provide access for them to the legal person’s documents, records and registers. The 
executive officer shall be entitled to request a written declaration of confidentiality before the provision 
of information or access. 
(2) The executive officer may refuse to give information and to provide access to documents if this would 
infringe upon the legal person’s trade secrets, if the requesting party exercises his right in a manner 
which is abusive, or if he refuses to make a declaration of confidentiality despite having been asked to 
do so. If the requesting party considers the refusal of information unjustified, he may request the Court 
of Registry to order the legal person to provide access to the information. 
79 Section 3:19 (2) of CC: Passing resolution 
(2)In the process adopting a resolution the following persons may not vote: 
a) any person for whom the resolution contains an exemption from any obligation or responsibility, or 
for whom any advantage is to be provided by the legal person; 
b) any person with whom an agreement is to be concluded according to the resolution; 
c) any person against whom legal proceedings are to be initiated according to the resolution; 
d) any person whose family member has a vested interest in the decision, who is not a member or 
founder of the legal person; 
e) any person who maintains any relation on the basis of majority control with an organization that has 
a vested interest in the decision; or 
f) any person who himself has a vested interest in the decision. 
80 Section 3:2 (2) of CC: Liability for the legal person’s debts 
(2)In the event of abuse of limited liability on the part of any member of a legal person, on account of which any 
outstanding creditors’ claims remain unsatisfied at the time of the legal person’s dissolution without succession, 
the member in question shall be subject to unlimited liability for such debts. 
81 Section 6:540 of CC: Liability for the acts of members of legal persons 
(2)If a member of a legal person causes damage to third party in connection with his membership, liability in 
relation to the injured person lies with the legal person. 
(3)Liability of the member and the legal person shall be joint and several if the damage was caused intentionally. 
82 Section 3:118 of CC: Liability of executive officers in respect of third parties 
In the event of a business association’s dissolution without succession, creditors may bring action for damages 
up to their claims outstanding against the company’s executive officers on the grounds of non-contractual 
liability, should the executive officer affected fail to take the creditors’ interests into account in the event of an 
imminent threat to the business association’s solvency. This provision is not applicable in the case where the 
company is wound up withut going into liquidation. 
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provision on the liability of the subsidiaries’ executive officers (Section 3:55 (4) of 
Civil Code); 
- the safeguards for the lawful operation of the legal person (the judicial oversight of 
Court of Registry,83 the judicial review of the resolution of legal person by court,84 
the protection of minority stakeholders,85 the arbitration proceeding86 etc.). 
 
V. Short overview in the Central-East Europe in connection with the interest of 
the group 
 
The German concern law influenced the legislation of Portugal (1986), Hungary (1988), 
the Czech Republic (1991-2002), Slovenia (1993), Croatia (1993), Albania (2008), and most 
recently Turkey (2012), and outside Europe: Brazil (1976).87 In Spain (2002) and Switzerland 
there were attempts to regulate the recognition of the group interest.88 
In Poland there is no standard category for the group interest; a reference to the group 
interest can be found in the draft of the amendment (28 July 2009) of the Commercial 
Companies Code: the group of companies comprises the parent company and subsidiary 
company or companies, in actual or contractual permanent organizational solution and with 
common economic interest (interest of the group of companies); the parent company and 
subsidiary company, within the group of companies, is governed, apart from the interest of the 
company, by the interest of the group of companies, taking into account justified interest of 
the creditors and minority shareholders of the subsidiary company.89 
In Austria the concept of the group interest is not recognized in the legal texts, the general 
tools of company law are used in order to tackle the legal problems of the group of 
corporations (for instance: prohibition to distribute assets). The §§ 56, 70, 84 and 238 of 
Austrian Act on Stock Companies regulate the relations within the group of corporations at 
the factual and at the contractual groups of corporations.90 
                                                            
83 Section 3:34 of CC; §§ 72-91 of Firm Act 
84 Sections 3:35-3:37 of CC 
85 Sections 3:103-3:106 of CC 
86 Section 3:92 of CC 
87 CONAC: op.cit. pp. 199-200. 
88 CONAC: op.cit. p. 200., p. 202. 
89 MASNIAK, DOROTA: Recognition of concept of group interest in Poland, contribution to the workshop 
about the group interest, 18-19 February 2015, Vienna, WU FOWI, Societas CEE Company Law Research 
Network 
90 WINNER, MARTIN: Group interest in Austria, contribution to the workshop about the group interest, 18-19 
February 2015, Vienna, WU FOWI, Societas CEE Company Law Research Network 
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In Serbia the linking company may be a corporate group (concern), a holding company, 
or a mutually-owned company; there are three different types of corporate group: the factual, 
the contractual groups and the group of equal members (the companies do not subordinate to 
each other, but are managed in united manner). Under the effective Serbian Law on Business 
Organisations, in the contractual group of corporations the controlling company shall have the 
right to issue binding instructions to subsidiaries (with due diligence of the acting directors of 
the parent company), taking into account the group’s interest.91 
In Romanian law the concept of the group interest is not determined in the legal texts, but 
the phrase appears in the Romanian jurisdiction (it is of importance in insolvency law). The 
act on companies (1999) has classical attitude to this topic: each company is an independent 
entity with independent interests.92 
After this short overview – which reflects very different approaches of the group of 
corporations - I reckon that it is necessary to clarify the concept of the group interest, and on 
its ground the relation among parent company and subsidiaries (for example: according to the 
instruction right of the controlling company) at EU level in order to provide a „safe harbour” 
for managers of controlling and controlled companies against civil and criminal liability. 
                                                            
91 DUDÁS ATTILA: The legal recognition of group interest of companies under Serbian Law, contribution to 
the workshop about the group interest, 18-19 February 2015, Vienna, WU FOWI, Societas CEE Company Law 
Research Network 
92 VERESS EMŐD: The recognition of the group interest in Romania, contribution to the workshop about the 
group interest, 18-19 February 2015, Vienna, WU FOWI, Societas CEE Company Law Research Network 
